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SUMMARY OF SE-20 "THE PROBABLE CONSEQUENCES OF
CERTAIN POSSIBLE US COURSES OF ACTION WITH
RESPECT TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND KOREA"

1. An intensification of UN operations in Korea and an expansion of the war to include bombardment of Manchuria and an interdiction of Communist China's seaborne imports, if successful, would probably have the following effects on Communist capabilities: (1) the Chinese Communists would be unable to continue large-scale operations in Korea; (2) lines of communication in Manchuria would be disrupted; (3) Communist China would be forced into an increased dependence on the USSR for military supplies and other critical imports; (4) Chinese Communist capabilities for military operations in Southeast Asia would be reduced substantially; and finally (5) an increase of Soviet commitments in the Far East would reduce Soviet capabilities elsewhere.

2. The USSR would almost certainly expand its aid to Communist China in response to these US courses of action. This aid would probably include increasing commitment of Soviet air defense elements in Communist China and North Korea. If the Communists found that such measures were proving unsuccessful in countering the US effort, the USSR would probably intensify its aid. This aid might well include the introduction of "volunteer" forces. It might even include the employment of Soviet forces to such an extent that a de facto war between the US/UN and the USSR would exist in the Far

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East. At every stage, however, the Kremlin would probably endeavor to keep open the possibility of ending the conflict by political negotiation if the global interests of the USSR would be served by disengagement.

3. It is recognized that precise information on enemy intentions is rarely available and that enemy counteraction under the various circumstances here considered cannot be predicted with complete accuracy. However, all aspects of the Soviet problem considered, we believe it unlikely that the USSR will deliberately choose to precipitate global war because of the implementation of the courses of action examined in this estimate. Nonetheless, the possibility of war by miscalculation cannot be discounted during a period of high international tension such as would result.